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VOL. XIV SEPTEMBER, 1936 No. 4
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AFFORDED BY THE
RECORDS OF INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO
REAL PROPERTY
JOSEPH BOUCEK*
N land titles, a person's lawful claim or interest in or to
real property is binding on and enforceable against
all persons who deal with the property and who have
notice of such lawful claim or interest. Such notice may
be classified as either actual or constructive. It is actual
when a person has actual knowledge of the claim or has
actual knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably
prudent man upon inquiry as to the claim that the facts
suggest.' Constructive notice, on the other hand, need
not be actually brought home to the person affected there-
by. The law conclusively presumes that one has such
notice of claims or interests of persons in possession
which would have been revealed on inquiry of such per-
sons and of instruments which have been recorded in the
manner provided by law.' This latter notice, which may be
termed as constructive notice from the record, will be
the subject of this article, and reliance will be had on
Illinois cases reported thereon. No attempt will be made
to treat of actual notice or notice afforded by possession.
* Member of the Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
t 46 C. J. 539, 540.
2 Noyes v. Hall, 97 U. S. 34, 24 L. Ed. 909 (1878).
3 Chicago P. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 206 Ill. 234, 69 N. E. 113 (1903).
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Constructive notice from the record arises by statute
only.4 The Illinois statutes thereon provide:
Deeds, mortgages, powers of attorney, and other instru-
ments relating to or affecting the title to real estate in this
State, shall be recorded in the county in which such real estate
is situated. . ..
All deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing which
are authorized to be recorded, shall take effect and be in force
from and after the time of filing the same for record, and not
before, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers, without
notice; and all such deeds and title papers shall be adjudged
void as to all such creditors and subsequent purchasers, with-
out notice, until the same shall be filed for record.6
These statutes do not require that the instruments be
recorded in order to make them valid7 but that they be
recorded in order to be effective as against "creditors
and subsequent purchasers without notice." Thus an
instrument properly recorded is notice to such creditors
and subsequent purchasers whether or not these creditors
and subsequent purchasers actually know of the instru-
ment, whether they have actually seen the record there-
of or not, if the instrument is one entitled to record.
Similarly, when the instrument is not recorded, the cred-
itors and subsequent purchasers without notice may safe-
ly treat it as though it never in fact existed.'
The word "creditors" in the statute cited' has been
held to mean judgment creditors.10 The expression "sub-
sequent purchasers" has been construed to include mort-
gagees1' and purchasers at judicial sales, 2 'and means
subsequent in time to the time of recording of the instru-
4 In re Atlantic Beach Corp., 244 F. 828 (1917).
5 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 30, par. 29.
6 Ibid., Ch. 30, par. 31.
7 Irwin v. Brown, 145 Ill. 199, 34 N. E. 43 (1893).
s Dewitt v. Shea, 203 Ill. 393, 67 N. E. 761 (1903); Booker v. Booker,
208 Ill. 529, 70 N. E. 709 (1904).
9 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 30, par. 31.
10 Crawford v. Logan, 97 Ill. 396 (1881).
11 Schroeder, Admr. v. Wolf, 227 Ill. 133, 81 N. E. 13 (1907).
12 McNitt v. Turner, 83 U. S. 352, 21 L. Ed. 341 (1873).
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ment of which the purchaser is required to take notice."3
The statute does not, therefore, apply to prior purchasers;
that is to say that a prior purchaser in a recorded deed
need not take notice of a subsequent purchaser or incum-
brancer as far as his own prior lien or interest is con-
cerned. 14 "Subsequent purchasers" has also been held
to apply to subsequent purchasers from the heirs of a
deceased grantor in an unrecorded deed as well as to
purchasers from the grantor himself. That is, where
a grantee has failed to record his deed, a subsequent pur-
chaser from the same grantor or from the heirs of that
grantor, if the grantor had since died, gets a good title,
provided that he has not had some other notice of the un-
recorded deed and provided he recorded his deed before
the prior grantee has recorded his.15
Although the statute hereinbefore cited16 refers to
creditors (meaning judgment creditors) as well as to
subsequent purchasers, this article will not attempt to
consider the notice afforded by judgments and decrees, 7
nor will it take up lis pendens notice,' notice of mechanics
liens, 19 notice of probate proceedings or records of wills
or proceedings thereon, 20 notice of general and special
taxes and assessments, 21 or notice under the Torrens
system.2
In considering constructive notice from the record,
our first query, suggested by the broad wording of the
statute above set forth,28 is whether or not the records
'3 Montague & Co. v. Aygarn, 164 Ill. App. 596 (1911).
14 Schultze v. Houfes, 96 Ill. 335 (1880); Elder v. Derby, 98 Ill. 228
(1881).
15 Kennedy v. Northup, 15 Ill. 148 (1853).
16 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 30, par. 31.
17 Ibid., Ch. 77, pars. 1, 6, 82; Ch. 22, pars. 44, 45; Ch. 79, pars. 125, 136,
137; Ch. 37, pars. 456, 527.
Is Ibid., Ch. 22, par. 57.
19 Ibid., Ch. 82, par. 1-40.
20 Ibid., Ch. 30, par. 34; Ch. 3, par. 99: Ch. 148, pars. 2, 9, 10, 11, 12.
21 Ibid., C. 120, par. 268; Ch. 24, par. 182.
22 Ibid., Ch. 30, pars. 49-153.
28 Ibid., Ch. 30, par. 31.
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charge the creditors and subsequent purchasers with
constructive notice of any and every instrument that may
or might affect the real estate in which such creditor
or purchaser is interested. Manifestly, that would be
unreasonable and impracticable, especially in our large
cities where volumes of instruments affecting real prop-
erty are recorded daily. Admittedly, there must be
some limitation as to which records of instruments should
be held to give constructive notice. Constructive notice
has accordingly been held to be limited to recorded instru-
ments within the chain of title of the piece of property in
question, which chain of title is defined as "the successive
conveyances commencing with the patent from the gov-
ernment or some other source and including the convey-
ance to the one claiming title. "2 The patent from the
government is the first link in a chain of title. That link
would consist of the period of time during which the pat-
entee held title, that is, until he executed and delivered a
deed to another. Then with the new owner a new link
begins, and so on, the process continuing on through the
successive conveyances. Thus, any instrument executed
by a person during the time that he had title, affecting the
property, would be within the chain of title, and, if prop-
erly recorded, would afford constructive notice to cred-
itors and subsequent purchasers. Therefore, when a
record owner executes a mortgage2 5 or deed 26 covering
the property, and the instrument is recorded, any creditor
or subsequent mortgagee or grantee will take with notice
of such prior mortgage or deed.
With the definition and illustration of the chain of title
as a starting point, let us review cases applying the defi-
nition to sets of actual facts. Probably the best case on
this subject is that of Capper v. Poulsen,21 decided in
24 Capper v. Poulsen, 321 Ill. 480, 152 N. E. 587 (1926).
25 Schroeder, Admr. v. Wolf, 227 Ill. 133, 81 N. E. 13 (1907).
26 Dewitt v. Shea, 203 Ill. 393, 67 N. E. 761 (1903).
27 321 Ill. 480, 152 N. E. 587 (1926).
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
1926. There one Poulsen, being the owner of certain real
estate, in 1916 conveyed the property by a warranty deed
to one Barnett. At the same time Barnett was alleged to
have given Poulsen a writing which was either an option
to repurchase or an acknowledgment of the right to re-
deem. This writing was not recorded although the war-
ranty deed was then recorded. Thereafter in 1917 Poul-
sen recorded his own affidavit wherein he stated that the
warranty deed given by him to Barnett was intended as
a mortgage to secure a debt and not as a conveyance of
the fee. Subsequently, in 1920, Barnett conveyed to
Amerman, who later conveyed to the complainant. The
latter then brought this action to quiet his title. The ques-
tion is whether the Poulsen affidavit was a cloud on the
complainant's title. The court held that it was not, for
the reason that the affidavit was not within the chain of
title to the property and was, therefore, not constructive
notice to him, and he had had no other notice thereof.
The affidavit did not come within this chain, since, at the
time it was recorded, the affiant, Poulsen, no longer had
any title to the property of record. The record then
showed that he had conveyed all his title away in 1916
and it would be burdensome to charge subsequent gran-
tees with any statements he made subsequent thereto
about the property, of which they did not know. As far
as Poulsen was concerned, the chain ended as to him
with his deed to Barnett and any conveyances or admis-
sions as to the property that he made thereafter could
not, when recorded, be constructive notice. The doctrine
here applied is well stated in the case of Thorpe v.
Helmer,2 8 where it is said that "the record of a deed is
constructive notice only to parties holding in the same
chain of title, and a purchaser is not required to examine
every record that might by some possibility affect real
estate before he can safely take the title."
28 275 I11..86, 113 N. E. 954 (1916).
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The same holding results when a mortgage is executed
and recorded by one who the record shows did not have
title at the time the mortgage was recorded. 9 A pur-
chaser is not required to search the records prior to the
time that an owner acquired title to discover acts that he
may have done to impair that title before it was vested
in him as disclosed by the records. A person is within
a chain of title from the date a deed to him as grantee
is recorded. His deeds made as grantor and recorded
prior to that date are not within the chain and therefore
do not afford constructive notice.
The ruling applies still more forcibly where the instru-
ment of record is executed by one whom the record does
not show ever to have had title. In the case of Rohde v.
Rohn,30 in a contest between two mortgagees for priority,
it was held that the mortgage executed by a certain
Dimond, who by the record appeared never to have had
title, was not constructive notice and therefore was not
binding as against a subsequent mortgage executed by
one who, the record indicated, did have title. Instruments
executed by a stranger to the title, that is, by one not
connected to the chain as grantee in some deed within the
chain, are not in the chain of title and therefore cannot
give constructive notice.
In another case of an unrecorded deed, Booker v.
Booker,"' a husband purchased property for his wife with
her money but took title in his own name and recorded
the deed. He then executed a deed of the property to his
wife, but this deed was not recorded. The wife later
executed a mortgage of the property to a third party
and had the mortgage recorded. The court held that as
to subsequent purchasers without notice, the husband had
a good title, and the recorded mortgage executed by the
29 Lesser v. Kibort, 243 Ill. App. 258 (1927).
30 232 IlM. 180, 83 N. E. 465 (1907).
:1 208 IM. 529, 70 N. E. 709 (1904).
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wife was not constructive notice of an unrecorded deed
from the husband to the wife. The mortgage was out-
side of the chain of title and therefore a prudent searcher
of the record would not find it in his search of the record.
The same result was reached in 1934 in a case wherein
the plaintiff showed a connected chain of title, while the
defendant, whose chain started with a sale by an assignee
in bankruptcy, was not in the chain of title, because, at
the time of the said sale, the bankrupt, according to the
records, no longer had title to the property, but had con-
veyed it away about a year prior to that time.1
2
In another case on the same point, a mortgage executed
by a certain Moore, appeared of record, but the record
did not show any deeds by which Moore acquired title or
which connected him to the chain of title. It was held
that this mortgage was not constructive notice and not
binding on the property as against creditors and sub-
sequent purchasers without notice; that a purchaser
without notice is not constructively charged with every-
thing which may appear o record but that he is only
charged with instruments within the apparent chain
of title; that to require more of such a purchaser would
be unreasonable and impracticable."
As to instruments within the chain of title, it may here
be noted that it is not necessary to record within the
state the patents issued by the government on lands
within the state. The original record in the general land
office at Washington, D. C., from which patents are is-
sued is notice to the world of their existence. 4
The holdings in regard to the chain of title thus far
discussed may be more readily appreciated if it is un-
derstood that the only indices to the records required by
law, and therefore the only ones to be noticed, are the
32 Manson v. Berkman, 356 I1. 20, 190 N. E. 77 (1934).
33 Irish v. Sharp, 89 Ill. 261 (1878).
34 Lomax v. Pickering, 173 U. S. 26, 43 L. Ed. 601 (1899).
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grantor's and grantee's indices.5 5 It is almost impossible
to locate all instruments that one must take notice of
with only these indices as an aid, unless the doctrine of
chain of title is applied. In applying the doctrine, the
searcher will start with the present owner and trace back
in the grantee's index to the time a deed is reached
wherein he is grantee. Then that grantee will be dropped
and the grantor in that deed will be traced back in the
grantee's index from the date the deed is recorded until
a deed is reached wherein he is the grantee. This proc-
ess will be repeated until some source, like a patent from
the government, will be reached. The search will then
be reversed and the grantor's index will be traced for
instruments executed by the patentee down to the time a
deed of the fee executed by the patentee is reached. The
patentee will then be dropped and the grantor's index
will then be traced from the date appearing on the last
deed, for instruments executed by the grantee in that
deed until a deed is reached wherein the same grantee
conveys the fee. The process is repeated down through
the latest grantee for any instruments executed by such
latest grantee. If the search thus made, leads link by
link to the source and back to the same present owner,
the latter is within the chain of title. Furthermore, all
instruments located by this search, relating to the prop-
erty, will be within the chain of title and will give con-
structive notice.
Summarizing the matters we have so far considered,
we may make the following generalizations:
1. Not every instrument of record relating to real
estate is held to be constructive notice to persons subse-
quently dealing with that property, but only the instru-
ments within the apparent chain of title afford such
notice.
35 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 115, par. 13; Lesser v. Kibort, 243
11. App. 258 (1927).
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2. A chain of title consists of the successive convey-
ances from the government or some other source to the
one claiming title, each link consisting of the period of
time during which a person has title, the link beginning
with a deed wherein that person is grantee and ending
with a deed wherein he is grantor.
3. Instruments are in the chain of title and afford
constructive notice when they are executed by a person
who is the grantee in a deed within the chain of succes-
sive conveyances from the source to him, if the instru-
ments executed by him are recorded during the interval
of time between the date of the recorded deed wherein he
is such grantee and the date a deed is recorded wherein
he is the grantor. Instruments that are recorded at any
other time are not within the chain of title and therefore
do not afford constructive notice to creditors and sub-
sequent purchasers without notice.
Having considered the question of when an instrument
is or is not within the chain of title, we may now review
cases touching on constructive notice from the records
under the following headings: (1) Recitals in the record
as constructive notice of unrecorded instruments. (2) The
notice afforded by the record of deeds with defective or
erroneous descriptions. (3) Constructive notice of the
contents of recorded instruments within the chain of
title. (4) Notice of latent defects and secret equities.
(5) Constructive notice afforded by unauthorized or
fraudulent releases. (6) Constructive notice afforded by
records of irregularly, defectively, or invalidly executed
instruments. (7) Constructive notice afforded by the
record of a forged deed. (8) Constructive notice afforded
by destroyed or mutilated records.
RECITALS IN THE RECORD AS CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF
UNRECORDED INSTRUMENTS
We have seen that a record of an instrument not in the
chain of title will not give constructive notice that the
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grantor therein may hold an unrecorded deed. The same
is true where a recital as to an unrecorded deed appears
in a recorded deed that is not in the chain of title. In the
case of Kerfoot v. CroniA6 it was held that a recital in a
trust deed of record, not in the chain of title, executed by
one Hansbrough, which described the note secured by the
trust deed as payable to the order of one Samuel J.
Walker (then the owner of the land of record) and as be-
ing "given for the purchase money to be paid for the
premises hereinafter described . . ." did not give notice
of an unrecorded deed from Walker to Hansbrough.
Mr. Justice Mulkey there said for the court on rehearing:
"Where one is not chargeable with notice of the record
of a deed because apparently between strangers to his
title, he will not be deemed to have constructive notice
of any recitals contained in it."
But where the instrument containing the recital is
within the chain of title, a different holding results. In
the case of Crawford v. The Chicago Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Company37 a trust deed was executed
but was not recorded. Later a contract to sell the prop-
erty was recorded and was in the chain of title. That
contract provided that it was subject to an incumbrance
of $130,000, due in four years, from "October next, with
interest at 7 per cent, payable semi-annually." The court
held that this provision was sufficient constructive notice
of the trust deed, that the purchaser would be required
to pursue this notice to its source-in this case to inter-
view the parties to this contract and obtain whatever
information he could get from them, and failing to do
this, he would be charged with all that would have been
learned had he pursued and investigated the matter to
the full extent to which it lead.
In the case of Sidwell v. Wheaton 3 a recital in a deed
36 105 Ill. 609 (1882).
37 112 Ill. 314 (1884).
38 114 Ill. 267, 2 N. E. 183 (1885).
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within the chain of title that the conveyance was made
subject to two certain trust deeds, describing them, was
held to make these trust deeds a charge on the land in
question, when as a matter of fact the trust deeds,
through mistake, had not included this land although the
parties thereto intended to include it. The trust deeds
and the deed in question were executed by the same
grantor. And in the case of Gallagher & Speck v. Chicago
Title & Trust Company,3 9 where property had been con-
veyed to the Chicago Title & Trust Company "as Trus-
tee, under the provisions of a trust agreement dated the
12th day of September, 1916, and known as Trust Num-
ber 6624," it was held that this recital gave notice that
the company was holding as trustee only and that some-
one else was the beneficial owner thereof.
THE NOTICE AFFORDED BY THE RECORD OF DEEDS WITH
DEFECTIVE OR ERRONEOUS DESCRIPTIONS
Another question on constructive notice of record
arises as to the notice given by instruments with defec-
tive or erroneous descriptions. In the case of Thorpe v.
Helmer,4 0 the description was otherwise correct except
that it placed the land in section 16 instead of section 26,
and the court held that the record did not give construc-
tive notice of the trust deed. The fact that there was
only one such subdivision named in the description in
the county, was held not to aid the matter, as a purchaser
would not necessarily know this. The court held that
the record of an instrument affecting the title to land
is constructive notice only so far as the land is correctly
described, unless it is apparent from the record itself
that there is a misdescription. The same result occurred
where the land was described as in the north half of the
northwest quarter instead of the south half of the north-
39 238 Il1. App. 39 (1925).
40 275 Il. 86, 113 N. E. 954 (1916).
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west quarter;"' or as in Range 1 west instead of Range
1 east ;42 or as in section 11 instead of section 17 ;4 or
as in section 24 instead of section 13 ;44 or as lot 5, also
five feet off the entire west side of lot 6 instead of lot
5, also five feet off the entire east side of lot 6 ;45 or as
in section 35 instead of section 26 ;16 or as in block 20
in West Joliet instead of in block 16 in West Joliet.4
7
In these cases it was immaterial that there was no other
subdivision of the same name in the county or that the
record nowhere indicated that the grantor ever owned
the land described although it did show that he owned
the land intended to be described. As to the contention
that the record nowhere indicated that the grantor ever
bad title to the described land, the court suggested that
purchasers might well assume an unrecorded deed. The
same result occurred where the description by mistake
covered a parcel of land of 40 acres not owned by the
grantor nor intended to be included, and failed to include
a 40 acre parcel owned by the grantor and intended to be
conveyed."8 It was held not to cover the 40 acres not in-
cluded in the description, as far as constructive notice
was concerned. In all of these cases the deeds may have
sufficiently described the land as between the original
parties thereto and persons with actual notice, but the
question was whether they were sufficient to give con-
structive notice to creditors and subsequent purchasers
that there was a conveyance of the land intended to be
conveyed.
Where the misdescription is in a deed, which on its
41 Snyder v. Partridge, 138 11. 173, 29 N. E. 851 (1891).
42 Yarnell v. Brown, 170 Ill. 362, 48 N. E. 909 (1897).
43 Slocum v. O'Day, 174 Ill. 215, 51 N. E. 243 (1898).
44 Lesser v. Kibort, 243 Ill. App. 258 (1927).
45 Carpenter v. Young, 280 11. App. 116 (1935).
46 Yeck v. Crum, 122 Ill. 267, 14 N. E. 3 (1887).
47 Rodgers v. Cavanaugh, 24 Ill. 583 (1860).
48 Wait v. Smith, 92 Ill. 385 (1879).
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face seems sufficient to convey the land described, a
purchaser can assume that it actually is intended to
cover the land it describes and may therefore disregard
it as to other land. But where it is apparent on the face
of the deed that there is an error in the description and
there is enough description to convey the land, a different
result is obtained. In the case of Merrick v. Wallace,19
the land was described as in section thirteen-four instead
of thirty-four and it was held that since it was apparent
on the record that an. error had been made in the deed,
purchasers had constructive notice of the deed. This
error also indicated that section 34 was probably in-
tended. In the case of Myers v. Perry," the description
was otherwise correct except that it left out the town-
ship altogether. The court held that it was apparent on
the record that there was an error in the description and
purchasers were placed on notice of the instrument. In
the case of Citizens' National Bank v. Dayton,," the trust
deed purported to describe a part of lot 25 by metes and
bounds, but the beginning was placed in the southwest
corner of lot 25 instead of in the southeast corner of the
lot, so that the description bounded a piece of land in an
adjoining lot and not in lot 25. It was held that as the
record showed that the mortgagor intended to describe
land in lot 25, although description did not do so, and
did own land in lot 25 and none in the adjoining lot, the
error was apparent on the record, and purchasers were
placed on notice. A similar result was reached where the
description read in part, "commencing 50 feet 9 inches
and 30 feet east of the northwest corner of the southwest
quarter of section 21" instead of "commencing 50 feet
9 inches south and 30 feet east of the northwest corner,"
etc. It was held that with the word "south" omitted, the
49 19 I11. 486 (1858).
50 72 I11. App. 450 (1897).
51 116 I11. 257, 4 N. E. 492 (1886).
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description on its face indicated error and put pur-
chasers on notice.52
Where the description in the recorded deed seems regu-
lar but does not in fact describe the land intended and
there is some other statement in the deed showing this
error, the deed is held to give constructive notice of the
land intended. In the case of Coleman v. Mulcahey,
53
the land was described as in section 21 instead of in
section 22 as intended, but the instrument also contained
the recital, "All being lands now occupied by the mort-
gagors, and all lands owned by them." The mortgagors
owned and occupied the land in section 22 and none in
section 21. It was held that the recital put purchasers
on notice since the mortgagors were in possession of
land in section 22 and the record indicated that they did
not own any land in section 21.
The same decision was reached in Bowen v. Galloway,54
where the description read in part, "Lot No. 4 in Block
13," and as a matter of fact this block contained two
different lots No. 4, one being the original lot 4 and the
other being sub-lot 4 of a resubdivision of lots 1 and 2
in the same block. The description also stated that the
land had "a frontage of 241/2 feet and a depth of 80 feet.
Also one two-story and basement frame dwelling house
thereon." The sub-lot was intended, it complied with the
dimensions, and it had a two story and basement frame
dwelling thereon, while the original lot 4 did not meet
these dimensions, nor did it have any two-story frame
dwelling thereon. The court stated that the description
need not be of any particular kind as long as it in fact
identifies the property, that in this case in investigating
the recital as to dimensions and the building on the lot,
52 Russell v. Ranson, 76 Il. 167 (1875).
53 242 Ill. App. 462 (1926), affirmed on other grounds in 334 Ill. 64, 165
N. E. 189 (1929).
54 98 Ill. 41 (1881).
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it was apparent that there was an error in the descrip-
tion, and purchasers of sub-lot 4 had constructive notice
of the instrument as affecting that lot.
CoNsTRucTrvE NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF RECORDED
INSTRUMENTS WITHIN THE CHAIN OF TITLE
In the case of Simonson v. Goldberg," the owner of two
adjoining lots had built an apartment house on one and
placed the sidewalk for said building wholly in the ad-
joining lot. He subsequently sold the apartment, retain-
ing the adjoining lot. The deed contained the following
provision: Nothing contained in this deed shall be con-
strued as a conveyance of or a lien upon or over any
premises adjoining the premises hereby conveyed." Sub-
sequently, the plaintiff purchased the premises with the
apartment building, and the defendant purchased the
adjoining lot. The court held that the provision last
above quoted negatived the easement for the sidewalk
and since it was in a recorded deed within the chain of
title, subsequent purchasers without notice were bound
thereby. Similarly, in a case56 where the grantors only
had a life estate by a recorded deed, and a purchaser
from them, relying on an abstract which failed to set out
their interest as merely life tenants, and purchasing, as
he thought, a fee simple estate, was held to have construc-
tive notice of the extent of the interest of his grantors.
It is also held that recitals in recorded deeds to the effect
that the deed is made subject to the payment by the
grantee to the grantor of a certain sum per annum dur-
ing the grantor's life " give constructive notice and are
binding upon subsequent purchasers without notice. In
the case of Thompson v. Maloney,5 the subdivider filed
55 338 Ill. 420, 170 N. E. 252 (1930).
56 Hagan v. Varney, 147 I1. 281, 35 N. E. 219 (1893).
57 Powell v. Powell, 335 Ill. 533, 167 N. E. 802 (1929); Gallaher v.
Herbert, 117 Ill. 160, 7 N. E. 511 (1886).
58 199 I1. 276, 65 N. E. 236 (1902).
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his plat and sold lots by a reference to this plat. Although
the plat was not a statutory one because it did not fully
comply with the statute, yet the plat amounted to a com-
mon law dedication of the streets and alleys in the subdi-
vision, and since the descriptions in the recorded deeds
referred to the subdivision by name, and since the plat
was recorded, the creditors of the subdivider had con-
structive notice of the dedication and were bound thereby.
In another case 9 the property was subject to a re-
corded trust deed containing a power of sale. The power
of sale was exercised and the land sold to one Coates.
The mortgagor then sold his equity in the land to another
before the Coates' deed was recorded, and the deed of
the mortgagor's grantee was recorded before the Coates
deed was. The court held that since the trust deed was
of record unreleased and contained the power of sale,
it gave constructive notice of whatever might .be done in
the exercise of the power of sale, and therefore gave
notice of the Coates deed.
In the case of Black & Farwell v. Hills & Gammon,"0
a minor conveyed his land during minority by deed, which
was duly recorded, and later, after majority executed a
contract to convey to the same grantee, but before the
contract was recorded conveyed to another who recorded
his deed before the contract was recorded. It was held
that the deed executed and recorded during minority was
not constructive notice of any interest of the grantee
therein in the land, nor that the minor might ratify it
after majority, for as a matter of law the execution of
the later deed amounted to a disaffirmance of the earlier
one.
Again in the case of Babcock v. Lisk 6 1 where a mort-
gage recited that it was given to secure a $70 note and
59 Mansfield v. Excelsior Refinery Co., 135 U. S. 326, 34 L. Ed. 162
(1890).
60 36 I11. 376 (1865).
61 57 I11. 327 (1870).
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later recited that it was also in consideration of $500 paid
to the mortgagor, the court held that a subsequent pur-
chaser must take notice of all recitals in recorded instru-'
ments in the chain of title and in this case was put on
notice whether the amount of the mortgage was $70 or
$570. In the case of Bullock v. Battenhousen"2 it was held
that where a mortgage fails to state the consideration or
the amount of the debt it secures or fails to give suffi-
cient information so that the amount may be ascertained,
the record of the mortgage does not afford constructive
notice of the mortgage to subsequent purchasers, because
a mortgage is merely a security for a debt, and cannot
exist without such a debt; therefore a mortgage must set
out the consideration in order to give constructive notice
thereof to subsequent purchasers. And where a mort-
gagor subsequently conveys his equity to the trutee in
the recorded trust deed, a merger does not necessarily
result, as the conveyance may have been made for some
other purpose, or it may have been intended to keep the
mortgage alive to retain a prior lien thereon as against
incumbrances subsequent to the mortgage.6 3 A sub-
sequent purchaser takes with constructive notice that a
merger was not intended.
NOTICE OF LATENT DEFECTS AND SECRET EQUITIES
In Ogden Building & Loan Association v. Mensch,64 a
mortgage to the association was acknowledged before a
notary public who was also a stockholder and director of
the association. A second mortgage was executed to a
third party. Although the acknowledgment was void be-
cause taken by an officer of the grantee in the mortgage,
and although the homestead rights were not, therefore,
waived, yet since the defect was a latent one and not
62 108 Ill. 28 (1883).
63 Edgerton v. Young, 43 IM. 464 (1867).
04 196 IMI. 554, 63 N. E. 1049 (1902).
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apparent on the face of the recorded mortgage, the mort-
gage afforded constructive notice of itself to subsequent
purchasers.6 5  Thus latent defects do not destroy the
constructive notice given by apparently regularly exe-
cuted instruments to subsequent purchasers.
The question of secret equities was before the court in
the case of McNab v. Young. 6 The holder of a mortgage
indebtedness authorized his agent to foreclose the mort-
gage for him. The agent did so and bought in the prop-
erty in his own name. Several years later the agent con-
veyed the property to an innocent purchaser without no-
tice, and never accounted for the proceeds to his princi-
pal. It was held that the purchaser took free of this
secret equity since the record nowhere gave any notice
thereof. The same decision was given in a case where
the patent was issued to one party when another was
rightfully entitled to it. 7 Since the record did not give
notice of the equitable claim of the one entitled to the pat-
ent, subsequent purchasers from the patentee, not having
any other notice, where protected in relying on the record
and took free of the equity. Defects and irregularities in
the exercise of a power of -sale in morfoages, whic. irrcg-
ularities do not appear affirmatively on the face of the
record, as, for example, that the premises were offered
for sale as a whole and not in separate parcels or that
the amount of the debt was overstated, are latent defects,
and subsequent purchasers without notice take free of
them.68
In the case of Dickerson v. Evans,6 9 it was claimed that
a grantor was induced to execute the deed by reason of
65 An officer or shareholder of a building and loan association can now
take acknowledgments of mortgages executed to the association. Ill. State
Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 32, par. 393(1).
66 81 Ill. 11 (1875).
67 Robbins v. Moore, 129 Ill. 30, 21 N. E. 934 (1889).
68 Hamilton v. Lubukee, 51 111. 415 (1869); Gibbons v. Hoag, 95 111. 45
(1880) ; Fairman v. Peck, 87 111. 156 (1877).
69 84 Ill. 451 (1877).
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the fraud practiced upon the grantor by her son, the
grantee. The court held that if there was fraud in the
inducement it was a secret equity which did not affect
subsequent purchasers without notice. In Curtis v.
Root,70 in order to make the recorded mortgage a prior
lien to that of the judgment creditors of the mortgagor,
it was alleged that it was a purchase-money mortgage,
but since the mortgage bore a date nine days later than
that on the deed to the mortgagor and the mortgage re-
cited that it was given to indemnify the mortgagee for
his signing an appeal bond, it was held that as to credi-
tors and subsequent purchasers the mortgage here could
not be claimed a purchase-money mortgage. The credi-
tors and subsequent purchasers without notice may rely
on the date of the instrument and the consideration stated
therein to be the true date and consideration unless the
instrument on its face shows that such may not be the
fact. Subsequent purchasers without notice are not af-
fected by secret equities.
In the case of Smith v. Willard71 the husband bought
property in his own name, though with the wife's money,
but she did not know that he had taken title in his own
name and did not discover it for about seven years,
within which time a creditor of the husband recovered a
judgment against him. The court held that as the title
remained in the husband's name of record for seven years
and the creditor did not have notice of the wife's equity,
the creditor took free of such equity. A judgment credi-
tor under the Illinois law is treated in the same manner
as a subsequent purchaser as far as notice of prior liens
is concerned. 72  Again where a tenant, by agreement
with his landlord of record title, was accepted as tenant
7028 Ill. 367 (1862).
71 174 Ill. 538, 51 N. E. 835 (1898).
72 German-American Nat. Bk. v. Martin, 277 Ill. 629, 115 N. E. 721
(1917).
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from month to month, when in fact this landlord had
cotiveyed to another, although that deed had not yet been
recorded, the court held that the tenant had a right to
deal with his old landlord since he did not have any notice
of the secret equity of the grantee under an unrecorded
deed. 73 And in the case of Manson v. Berkman,4 where
several forty year old recorded deeds in the plaintiff's
chain of title were claimed to be fraudulent because made
to hinder and delay creditors of which plaintiff had no
notice, the court held that the plaintiff took free of these
latent defects since the records in the chain of title to
his property gave no notice thereof.
But where the record does give notice of fraud or does
show facts suggesting fraud, the purchaser cannot disre-
gard such notice. So that where a guardian wished to
obtain for himself the ward's estate by sham court pro-
ceedings and sale, had his brother buy at the sale and
convey to the guardian, and both deeds were recorded
on the same day, a purchaser was placed on notice of the
fraud. A guardian cannot purchase at his own sale nor
have another purchase for him.75 A similar result was
had where a wildow, by sham proceedings in the Probate
Court to sell real estate to pay debts, tried to obtain for
herself property that had been devised to her and her
children, but the proceedings were void because the
minor children were not properly seived with summons
and because the petition was brought after the court had
lost jurisdiction of the estate. Subsequent purchasers
were required to take notice of the irregularities and
were thus put upon notice as to the fraudulent character
of the whole proceeding.
76
73 West Chicago Street R. R. Co. v. Morrison Adams & Allen Co., 160
Ill. 288, 43 N. E. 393 (1896).
74 356 Ill. 20, 190 N. E. 77 (1934).
75 Blake v. Blake, 260 Ill. 70, 102 N. E. 1007 (1913).
76 Heppe v. Szczepanski, 209 Ill. 88, 70 N. E. 737 (1904).
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CONsTuoTvE NOTICE AFFORDED BY UNAUTHORIZED OR
FRUDULENT RELEASES
Where a recorded release of a trust deed or mortgage
is authorized by the holder of the indebtedness, the re-
lease is binding in favor of subsequent purchasers with-
out notice, even though the consideration subsequently
fails,77 for a release is valid as to such persons unless
they are in some manner put on notice that it is unau-
thorized. A release executed several years after the
due date of the debt it secures, as shown by the recorded
mortgage, is binding in favor of subsequent purchasers
without notice even though it is unauthorized and the
debt is outstanding in the hands of innocent persons.
An extension agreement will not change the result unless
it is recorded. 78  The same decision is reached where the
trustee wrongfully releases the trust deed three days
after the debt becomes due,79 or even on the very day that
the instrument falls due.8" In these cases where the
debt is due, the fact that the purchaser is not shown
the cancelled notes, is not material. He may assume that
the debt has been paid, since it is due, and that the
recorded release is authorized. The same holding results
where a note is due "on or before five years after date"
and the trustee releases the trust deed securing the note
before the five years have expired.8 ' Since the note could
be paid at any time before maturity, the fact that it was
released before maturity was not a suspicious circum-
stance.
On the other hand, where a trust deed appeared to be
released about three years before the maturity of the
notes it secured, it was held that this fact together with
77 Seymour v. Mackay, 126 Ill. 341, 18 N. E. 552 (1888).
78 Mann v. Jummel, 183 Ill. 523, 56 N. E. 161 (1900); Sundquist v.
Rubin, 276 Ill. App. 347 (1934).
79 Bier v. Weiler, 203 Ill. App. 144 (1916).
80 Marsh v. Stover, 363 Ill. 490, 2 N. E. (2d) 559 (1936).
81 Lennartz v. Quilty, 191 Ill. 174, 60 N. E. 913 (1901).
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
the fact that the cancelled notes were not surrendered by
the trustee was sufficient to put the purchaser on inquiry
as to the authority of the trustee to execute the release.
82
Where the records show that the payee of the note
secured by the trust deed has obtained the fee to the land,
a release of the trust deed before maturity, will not be a
suspicious circumstance indicating that the note may be
outstanding and uncancelled, for the purchaser may as-
sume that the title and debt were merged, and his ques-
tioning the trustee or payee cannot reveal any more than
the release already states, as both the trustee and payee
in that case are interested in having the release state
exactly what it purports to state. 83  The same decision
results where there is a mortgage instead of a trust deed,
and the mortgagee subsequently acquires the equity of
the mortgagor and releases the mortgage of record be-
fore maturity, leaving the note uncancelled in the hands
of a third party who has not recorded his assignment.
A subsequent purchaser of the premises may assume
that the mortgage and the equity of redemption are
merged, since an inquiry of the mortgagee could not help
as he would be interested in stating that the debt is paid
as the release purports to state.8 4 And where, as in the
case of Vogel v. Troy, 5 the trustee on some pretext in-
duces the mortgagor to execute a duplicate set of notes,
and later before maturity, the trustee releases the trust
deed and cancels one set of notes and the property passes
to subsequent purchasers without notice who are shown
the cancelled notes and rely thereon as showing that the
release was authorized, the suspicious circumstance of
the release before due date being overcome by the presen-
82 Kennell v. Herbert, 342 I1. 464, 174 N. E. 558 (1931).
83 Havighorst v. Bowen, 214 Ill. 90, 73 N. E. 402 (1905). See also In re
Buchner, 202 F. 979 (1912), and Williams v. Jackson, 107 U. S. 478, 27 L.
Ed. 529 (1883).
84 Ogle v. Turpin, 102 Ill. 148 (1882).
85 232 Il1. 481, 83 N. E. 960 (1908). See also, Doyle & Fleming v.
Barnard, 271 11. App. 579 (1933).
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tation of the cancelled notes, the subsequent purchaser of
the property without notice takes the property free of
the mortgage.
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AFFORDED BY RECORDS OF IRREGU-
LARLY, DEFECTIVELYP OR INVALIDLY EXECUTED INSTRUMENTS
As to irregular, defective, or invalid execution of in-
struments and the constructive notice given by them, it
is held that a bond for a deed, although not acknowledged,
is entitled to record and is constructive notice,86 and a
mortgage or deed executed by a married woman prior to
the Married Woman's Act of 1874,87 was held to give
constructive notice of the grantee's claim when re-
corded.88 Likewise, a recorded deed lacking a seal, al-
though passing no title, gives constructive notice.89 Aside
from these decisions, the Illinois statute provides that an
unacknowledged deed, mortgage, or other instrument in
writing affecting real estate is constructive notice from
the time it is filed for record as to creditors and subse-
quent purchasers.90 On the other hand, an unsigned
copy of a contract is not entitled to be recorded and there-
fore does not give constructive notice.9 1
As to statutes curing certain defectively acknowledged
instruments, where two parties claim from the same
grantor by defectively acknowledged deeds, the statute,
passed after the recording of such deeds, validates them
on the effective date of the statute, and therefore both
become effective at the same time; in which case neither
of the instruments is prior to the other as far as the
recording act is concerned, and the common law rule pre-
vails, giving priority to the oldest deed.
92
86 Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 445 (1855).
87 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 68, par. 9.
88 Morrison v. Brown, 83 Il1. 562 (1876).
89 Wilson v. Kruse, 270 .11. 298, 110 N. E. 359 (1915).
90 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 30, par. 32.
91 Mack v. McIntosh, 181 Ill. 633, 54 N. E. 1019 (1899).
92 Noakes v. Martin, 15 Il1. 118 (1853) ; Deininger v. McConnel, 41 Ill.
227 (1866).
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McCreight v. Pinkerton" involved a somewhat differ-
ent situation. There the mortgagor executed two mort-
gages, the first of which was dated in 1914 but was not
recorded until 1926, and the second of which was dated in
1919 and recorded the same year. The later mortgage,
however, was acknowledged before a notary public who
was a stockholder and officer of the mortgagee, and
hence it was (at that time) latently defective. In 1929,
a curative statute was passed. 4 The court held that
while the later mortgage would be constructive notice
to subsequent purchasers and creditors because the ac-
knowledgment was regular on its face, it would not be
entitled to priority over the prior mortgagee, when, as
here, the prior mortgagee was first in point of valid
recordation, and the later mortgage would be considered
(as to prior parties) as validly recorded only from the
effective date of the act.
Where a deed is recorded in a county other than that
wherein the land is situated, and then a copy of that rec-
ord is recorded in the proper county, the record does not
afford constructive notice of the deed, as the copy is not
entitled to record, and documents not entitled to record
are held not to afford such notice." But where land is
situated in more than one county, a certified copy of the
instrument may be recorded in the counties other than
where the original is recorded, and such copies when
recorded give constructive notice as to land situated in
those counties. 6
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTIcE AFFORDED BY THE RECORD OF A
FORGED DEED
A forged deed or other instrument is void, is not en-
titled to record, and therefore does not afford construc-
93 258 Ill. App. 477 (1930).
94 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935); Ch. 30, par. 46(1).
95 St. John v. Conger, 40 IMI. 535 (1866).
90 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 30, par. 30.
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tive notice of itself." An owner who discovers a forged
deed of record against his property need not file any
notice of record that such a deed is a forgery to warn
those who might later claim through the forged deed.
He is merely required so to notify anyone that might
ask him. 8
Although a forged instrument conveys nothing, yet
when it is duly acknowledged before an officer designated
by law, as a notary public, the acknowledgment cannot
be impeached except on evidence of the "clearest, strong-
est and of the most convincing character, and by disin-
terested witnesses," it is an act of an officer, imports
verity, and unless given such weight, the land titles would
be thrown into chaos.99
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AFFORDED BY DESTROYED OR MUTI-
LATED RECORDS
Mutilation of the records does not effect the notice
that they afford. So, where a record is destroyed by
fire,100 or is destroyed or marred in some other manner,
it still is effective and subsequent purchasers have con-
structive notice thereof and of its contents. 10'
SuMMARY
1. The record of an instrument affecting title to real
estate is constructive notice of the instrument to credi-
tors and subsequent purchasers without notice if the
instrument is within the chain of title to the property it
purports to affect.
2. A chain of title consists of the successive convey-
ances commencing with the patent from the government
or some other source and including the conveyance to the
one claiming title.
97 Pry v. Pry, 109 Ill. 466 (1884); D'Wolf v. Haydn, 24 Ill. 526 (1860);
Oswald v. Newbanks, 336 11. 490, 168 N. E. 340 (1929).
98 Chandler v. White, 84 Ill. 435 (1877).
9 Kerr v. Russell, 69 Ill. 666 (1873) ; Baird v. Jackson, 98 Ill. 78 (1881).
100 Tucker v. Shaw, 158 Il1. 326, 41 N. E. 914 (1895).
101 Dodd v. Doty, 98 Ill. 393 (1881).
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3. An instrument is within the chain of title of a par-
cel of land if it is executed by one who at the time it is
recorded has title of record by a deed connected by a
chain of conveyances back to the patent from the govern-
ment or some other such source.
4. Recorded instruments not within the chain of title,
do not give notice of unrecorded instruments even though
such recorded instruments specifically refer to the un-
recorded instruments; while recitals in a recorded deed
within the chain of title as to unrecorded instruments do
give notice of such unrecorded instruments.
5. Recorded instruments with erroneous descriptions
do not afford constructive notice unless it is apparent on
the record that there is an error in the description.
6. A record of an instrument within the chain of title
affords constructive notice of the contents of the instru-
ment.
7. Latent defects and secret equities do not affect
creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice, un-
less some fact or facts appear of record giving warning
of such defects or equities.
8. Records of unauthorized or fraudulent releases are
valid as to creditors and subsequent purchasers without
notice unless there are suspicious circumstances suggest-
ing lack of authority to release, such as the release of a
trust deed before the due date of the debt secured thereby
and a non-production of the cancelled notes.
9. Records of defectively executed instruments within
the chain of title give constructive notice of the instru-
ments unless they are so defective as to lack all eviden-
tiary value, as for instance, unsigned deeds.
10. Records of forged deeds or releases are not con-
structive notice for any purpose.
11. Mutilation of public records does not affect tle
notice that they afford.
